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CHINA’S COLLECTIVE CONTRACT 
PROVISIONS: CAN COLLECTIVE 
NEGOTIATIONS EMBODY COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING? 
RONALD C. BROWN* 
INTRODUCTION 
Some people see things as they are and say, why?  I dream of things 
that never were and say, why not? 
George Bernard Shaw 
This article examines whether China’s new “collective negotia-
tions” law, in the context of Chinese conditions, can blossom into 
“collective bargaining,” as referenced by International Labor Organi-
zation (ILO) standards and compared with U.S. approaches.  Admit-
tedly, it is hard for many to imagine that multinational corporations 
such as Wal-Mart, Samsung, Dell, along with increasing numbers of 
Chinese domestic companies, could be negotiating labor terms and 
benefits above statutory minimums.  It is harder, perhaps, to convince 
the Chinese that in doing so, China can still maintain its areas of 
comparative advantage.  However, recent developments in China’s 
labor legislation suggest that, beyond sheer imagination, Chinese la-
borers now seem more enabled than ever to negotiate or bargain 
their working standards. 
On May 1, 2004, Provisions on Collective Contract (Provisions)1 
issued by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (MOLSS) became 
effective on a national level.  These Provisions build upon China’s ex-
perience since the mid-1980s with individual labor contracts and with 
the 1994 Labor Law’s mandate to create a system of collective con-
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 1. JITI  HETONG GUIDING [hereinafter PROVISIONS] art. 1 (Jan. 20, 2004), 
http://www.chinacourt.org/flwk/show1.php?file_id=91497 (last visited Nov. 1, 2005).  The 2004 
Provisions repeal the Jiti Hetong Guiding  (Provisions on Collective Contract) issued by then 
Ministry of Labor on December 5, 1994.  See PROVISIONS art. 57. 
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tracts.2  The 2004 Provisions provide that a collective contract can be 
negotiated on behalf of the employees to protect their employment 
and workplace interests.  Prior to 2004, several hundred thousand col-
lective contracts, which covered seventy-six million workers, were al-
ready in existence under earlier regulations.3  As will be discussed, 
many of these collective contracts could be described as bare-boned 
reflections of labor statutory minimums.  In contrast, the 2004 Provi-
sions provide more detail and apparently seek to eliminate some of 
the obstacles observed under the earlier negotiated agreements and 
to achieve more comprehensive contracts. 
The 2004 Provisions authorize employees to initiate the process 
through more authentic representatives to prepare proposals on a 
wide scope of subjects clearly beyond the usual statutory labor stan-
dards and protections.  The process of negotiations is delineated, with 
“good faith” requirements built in to facilitate cooperative exchanges 
of proposals.  The government’s Labor Bureaus are given regulatory 
responsibility to supervise and intervene in the negotiations to ensure 
fair dealing.  They also are authorized to resolve disputes arising prior 
to final agreement. 
Lastly, there is a process of formality in “finalizing” the collective 
contract.  The enforcement of the rights arising under this concluded 
contract are the same as those arising under the law regulating labor 
contracts, both of which utilize dispute resolution procedures within 
the enterprise, government-administered labor arbitration and the 
courts. 
This article examines the 2004 Provisions on collective negotia-
tions, sets forth some of the issues of the current Provisions, and 
draws comparative references to collective bargaining approaches in 
the United States and under the ILO’s labor standards; discusses their 
likely viability in China; and proposes a number of labor reform “pos-
 
 2. ZHONGHUA REMIN GONGHEGUO LAODONG FA [hereinafter LABOR LAW] arts. 33-35 
(July 5, 1994), http://www.chinacourt.org/flwk/show1.php?file_id=20195. 
 3. Reported figure from the Laodong Baozhang Bu [Ministry of Labor and Social Secu-
rity (MOLSS)], cited in Simon Clarke, Chang -Hee Lee and Qi Li, Collective Consultation and 
Industrial Relations in China, British Journal of Industrial Relations, June 2004, at 239-40 [here-
inafter Clarke].  The All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) claimed 510,000 enter-
prises had concluded such agreements, with 318,000 of these agreements within Foreign In-
vested Enterprises (FIEs), Privately Owned Enterprises (POEs), and Town and Village 
Enterprises (TVEs).  See Quanguo jianli pingdeng xieshang he jiti hetong zhidu qiye yu wushiy i-
wan hu [Collective Contract Protect Worker’s Rights: over 510,000 enterprises have established 
collective contract system], RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE’S DAILY], Nov. 20, 2001, at 1, available at 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper464/4750/519609.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2005) [hereina f-
ter Collective Contract Protect Worker’s Rights]. 
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sibilities,” when viewed in the context of China’s existing and evolv-
ing labor law environment. 
I.  CHINA’S 2004 COLLECTIVE CONTRACT PROVISIONS 
A. Legal Origins 
The new collective negotiation Provisions grew from a rather 
short legal history.  There was interest by China’s trade union, the All 
China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), in the early 1990s and 
it began to experiment with collective negotiations.4  The 1992 Trade 
Union Law in fact first authorized unions at the enterprise level to 
conclude collective contracts with the employer.5  The 1994 Labor 
Law further formalized the process and provided that the ACFTU 
was responsible to utilize this system nationally.6  The Trade Union 
Law as amended in 2001 continued to strengthen the union’s mandate 
in collective wage negotiations.7  Toward the end of 2001, the 
ACFTU reported it had over 510,000 such collective agreements at 
the enterprise level covering over 75 million workers.8 
Other legal documents contributing to the legal origins of collec-
tive negotiations were issued by the MOLSS in 2000 and 2001.  The 
first, the 2000 Interim Measures of Collective Wage Consultation,9 
rather comprehensively provides for annual wage negotiations be-
tween the employer and union.  It includes requirements of “good 
faith” negotiation and “fair representation.”10  This emphasis on 
“wage” negotiations would seem to reflect the government’s moving 
toward market-based determinations by the parties at local levels, yet 
still under a nationally -structured regulatory process. 
 
 4. TAYLOR ET AL., INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN CHINA 8 (2004) [hereinafter TAYLOR] 
 5. ZHONGHUA REMIN GONGHEGUO GONGHUI FA [hereinafter TRADE UNION LAW] art. 
18 (1992) (current version at ZHONGHUA REMIN GONGHEGUO GONGHUI FA [TRADE UNION 
LAW] art. 20 (amended 2001)), available at 
http://www.chinacourt.org/flwk/show1.php?file_id=38454 (last visited Nov. 1, 2005).  Hereina f-
ter, all articles are from a 2001 version. 
 6. LABOR LAW art. 33. 
 7. TRADE UNION LAW art. 10. 
 8. Collective Contract Protect Worker’s Rights, PEOPLE’S DAILY, supra note 3. 
 9. See GONGZI JITIXIESHANG SHIXING BANFA [INTERIM MEASURES OF COLLECTIVE 
WAGE CONSULTATION], MOLSS (2000), 
http://www.chinacourt.org/flwk/show1.php?file_id=36176 (last visited Nov. 1, 2005). 
 10. See id. art. 15.  Article 15 mandates that a party shall not harass, threaten, exaggerate, 
bribe, deceive, or defraud the other party.  This section is comparable to the good faith bargain-
ing requirement in Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 
333 (1938). 
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A second legal edict was issued on November 14, 2001 by several 
interested government organizations—MOLSS, ACFTU, State Eco-
nomic and Trade Commission (SETC), and China Enterprise Man-
agement Association, entitled, Joint Circular on Promoting Collective 
Consultation and Collective Contract.11  It reiterated the duty of em-
ployers to engage in collective negotiations and it called upon gov-
ernments, unions, workers’ congresses, and party members to partici-
pate in tri-party consultation to accomplish objectives.  The likely 
significance of this Joint Circular, promulgated in the month follow-
ing the newly amended Trade Union Law of 2001, is the political 
statement to the ACFTU, leading the collective negotiations, that the 
union must be mindful that there are other important interests and 
stakeholders in this process and the implementation of the collective 
agreement. 
B. 2004 Provisions on Collective Contract 
The 57 new Provisions are divided into eight chapters: 
One: General Rules (Arts. 1-7) 
Two: Content of Collective Negotiation (Arts. 8-18) 
Three: Collective Negotiation Representative (Arts. 19-31) 
Four:Collective Negotiation Procedures (Arts. 32-35) 
Five: Conclusion, Alteration, Recession and Termination of 
Collective Contract (Arts. 36-41) 
Six: Review and Examination of Collective Contracts (Arts. 42-
48) 
Seven: Resolution of Disputes on Collective Negotiation (Arts. 
49-54) 
Eight: Supplementary Articles (Arts. 55-57) 
1. Coverage and Purposes.  The Provisions are enacted in ac-
cordance with the Labor Law and the Trade Union Law.12  Article 56 
of the Provisions emphasizes the union’s authority by subjecting the 
“employing unit” (employers) to the Trade Union Law and other re-
lated laws and regulations if employer refuses to engage in collective 
negotiation requirements.13  The purposes of the Provisions are 
 
 11. GUANYU JINGYIBU TUIXING PINGDENG XIESHANG HE JITI HETONG ZHIDU DE 
TONGZHI [JOINT CIRCULAR ON PROMOTING COLLECTIVE CONSULTATION AND COLLECTIVE 
CONTRACT], MOLSS (Nov.14, 2001), http://www.chinacourt.org/flwk/show1.php?file id=38562 
(last visited Nov. 1, 2005).  
 12. PROVISIONS art. 1. 
 13. See id. art. 56. 
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“regulating the behavior of collective negotiation,” the “signing of the 
collective contract,” and the “protecting legal rights and interests of 
laborers and employing units.”14  All “enterprises and public institu-
tions that practice commercialized management within the P.R.C” are 
covered by the Provisions.15  This broad coverage parallels the cover-
age of employers and employees under China’s individual labor con-
tract system.16 
2. Negotiating Representatives.  There shall be legal negotiating 
representatives of equal numbers (at least three) on each side and 
each with one chief representative.17  The representative in the “em-
ployee party” shall be selected by the trade union of the unit (or, if 
none, then by democratic recommendations, agreed upon by one-half 
of the staff in that unit).18  The chief representative is the chair of the 
trade union unless an alternative is selected by the chair by written 
delegation (or if a union does not exist, the chief representative shall 
be elected from the negotiating representatives through democratic 
means).19 
Perhaps a significant change from past practice, Article 24 of the 
2004 Provisions stipulates, “negotiation representatives of the em-
ploying unit and those of the staff shall not act as each other’s repre-
sentatives.”20  This would appear to foreclose an employer designa t-
ing a trade union official as a negotiating representative of an 
employer, even where that official is a managerial employee of the 
employer, a scenario all too familiar under earlier practices.  The em-
ployer otherwise selects its own negotiating representatives.21 
An interesting provision, Article 23, permits both sides to select 
“professional personnel” (Zhuanye Renyuan) to act as the negotia-
tion representative.22  Limitations exist, as their number may not ex-
 
 14. Id. art. 1. 
 15. Id. art. 2. 
 16. LABOR LAW arts. 2, 16-32. 
 17. PROVISIONS art. 19. 
 18. Id. art. 20.  The original text says that the representative shall be appointed by the exist-
ing union of the unit.  It does not appear that the appointed representative has to pa ss the sim-
ple majority vote.  The employer has a duty to recognize the existence of such a bargaining unit 
by making an affirmative response to any negotiation request.  Id. art. 32.  See also TRADE 
UNION LAW art. 10. 
 19. PROVISIONS art. 20. 
 20. See id. art. 24. 
 21. Id. art. 21. 
 22. Id. art. 23. 
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ceed one-third of one side’s representatives, and no person outside 
one’s own unit can act as chief representative.23 
Certain traditional responsibilities and functions, such as partic i-
pation, sharing information, etc., are fixed upon the negotiating rep-
resentatives.24  Additionally, they are called upon to “safeguard the 
normal order of work and production and shall not adopt any action 
of threatening, buying popular support and deception.”25 
Employee representatives’ terms of service are determined by 
the represented party26 and their employment tenure is protected dur-
ing that term against employer’s retaliation of terminating the repre-
sentative’s labor contract.27  If the labor contract were to expire dur-
ing the representative’s tenure, Article 28 automatically extends the 
contract up to the completion of his representative obligation.28  Ex-
ceptions exist where the representative seriously violates employer 
rules, other employment-related duties, or has been investigated for 
criminal violations. 
3. Scope of Negotiable Subjects.  References to the delineated 
subjects for negotiation are in Article 33 of the Labor Law, and Arti-
cles 3 and 8-18 of the 2004 Provisions.  Article 3 of the Provisions de-
scribes the content of the collective contract as follows: 
[W]ritten agreement signed through collective negotiation . . . con-
cerning labor remuneration, working time, rest and holiday, labor, 
security and sanitation, professional training, and insurance and 
welfare in accordance with the stipulation of laws, regulations and 
rules; the special collective contract as set forth refers to the special 
written agreement signed between the employing unit and employ-
ees of that unit, in accordance with laws, regulations and rules, con-
cerning the content of collective negotiation.29 
Article 8 includes the scope of negotiable subjects that can be covered 
in the collective contract listing some 15 categories relating to em-
ployment.30  Articles 9-18 then list examples under each category.31 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. art. 25. 
 25. PROVISIONS art. 26. 
 26. Id. art. 22. 
 27. Id. art. 28. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. art. 3 (emphasis added).  A “special agreement” usually refers to a wage agreement 
or other agreement on a specific topic.  Article 4 again distinguishes between signing the “col-
lective contract or special contract,” and Article 6 states both are legally binding on the em-
ployer and employees.  Id. arts. 4, 6. 
 30. PROVISIONS art. 8. 
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4. Labor Bureau Supervision of Collective Negotiations.  Gen-
eral Provisions in Chapter One provide the principles and supervision 
for the conduct of negotiations.  Article 4 says negotiation shall 
mainly adopt the form of consultation “conference.”32  The negotia-
tion conduct shall observe the following principles: act legally, re-
spectfully, honestly, fairly, consult, cooperate and collaborate equally 
and in consideration of legal rights, and finally, “no drastic behavior is 
allowed.”33 
Responsibility for supervising the collective negotiation process, 
and the “signing, reviewing and performing” of the signed collective 
contracts or special collective contracts shall be with the Labor Bu-
reaus above county level.34  For any unresolved disputes that occur 
during the collective negotiations, but prior to the signing, either or 
both parties may submit a written application to the Labor Bureau 
requesting resolution.35  The Labor Bureau may also initiate resolu-
tion procedures on its own, as necessary.  The procedures in most 
cases should be ended within thirty days of acceptance of the case by 
the Labor Bureau.36  The Labor Bureau at the conclusion of its proc-
ess formulates an Agreement on Dispute Resolution.37  Thereafter, 
the Labor Bureau and the parties must agree and sign to be bound by 
the Agreement before it is effective.38  Some items in the Agreement 
where there was no unanimous resolution shall be carried on with 
continuous consultation. 
Separate dispute resolution provisions protect the rights of indi-
vidual employees, who are also negotiating representatives, against 
improper termination39 and modification of their normal work 
status.40  Such disputes are to be resolved by the local labor arbitra-
tion commission.41  The same forum is used to resolve any rights dis-
 
 31. Id. arts. 9-18. 
 32. Id. art. 4. 
 33. Id. art. 5. 
 34. Id. art. 7; see also id. arts. 42-48. 
 35. PROVISIONS art. 49. 
 36. Id. art. 52. 
 37. Id. art. 53. 
 38. Id. art. 54.  Thus, the Dispute Resolution Agreement appears to remain entirely volun-
tary. 
 39. Id. art. 28. 
 40. Id. art. 27. 
 41. PROVISIONS art. 29. 
02_BROWN.DOC  3/1/2006   12:51 PM 
42 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE &  INTERNATIONAL LAW  [Vol 16:35 
putes which arise out of the performance of the concluded collective 
contract.42 
5. Collective Negotiation Procedures.  Within the General Rules 
of convening a conference, wherein the meetings take place following 
prescribed rules of conduct conducive to negotiation, certain other 
procedures are provided in the Provisions.  To initiate the process, 
Article 32 states a party of collective negotiation may make written 
request of the other party; and a written response must be given 
within twenty days; and this request to negotiate may not be refused 
without proper reason.43  The “preparation phrase” then calls upon 
parties to familiarize themselves with the laws and regulations con-
cerning collective negotiations, collective recommendations from the 
employer and employees and identify topics for discussion during ne-
gotiation.44  After a location, time, recorder are chosen, the parties 
are prepared to begin.45 
The collective negotiation begins with each chief representative, 
in turn, addressing the agenda and procedures of the meeting.  
Thereafter, each will put forward concrete proposals and the other 
side will respond and discussion ensues regarding the proposals.46  
During the negotiations, the chief representatives shall make summa-
ries of the recommendations.  Those unanimously agreed upon shall 
be formed into the collective contract or special collective contract 
and signed by the chief representatives of both parties.47  In case there 
is no agreement on issues, the negotiation may be suspended, and the 
parties shall negotia te the next meeting place and content.48 
To conclude the collective contract, the agreed upon draft is pre-
sented to the employees for discussion.  Thereafter, a two-thirds quo-
rum must be present, and the draft must be approved by a majority of 
the workers’ congress representatives or a majority of the total em-
ployees (if a workers’ congress has not been established).49  Thereaf-
ter, the chief representatives of each side sign the contract, which is 
usually of one to three years in duration and can be extended by re-
 
 42. Id. art. 55. 
 43. See id. art. 32. 
 44. Id. art. 33. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. art. 34. 
 47. PROVISIONS art. 34(4). 
 48. Id. art. 35. 
 49. Id. art. 36. 
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quest and agreement of the parties.50  The contract, though binding on 
the parties, may be modified by the parties, or altered or terminated 
by certain conditions causing an inability to perform, such as bank-
ruptcy, force majeure, or conditions in the agreement.51 
The final step is to submit (register) the concluded collective con-
tract to the Labor Bureau for review and examination.52  It is exam-
ined to ensure compliance with legal requirements.53  If there is an 
“objection” by the Labor Bureau, the parties will be notified and the 
contract will be referred back to the parties who can renegotiate or 
re-sign, absent those portions.54  There seems to be a practice of little 
or no referral back to the parties.55  In the case of no objection by the 
Labor Bureau, the contract is effective within 15 days of receipt of the 
document.56  The law requires the contract to be promulgated “by the 
negotiation representative” to all employees on the day it becomes 
effective.57 
6. Duties of Proper Conduct for Collective Negotiations.  The 
regulatory framework of collective negotiations is set up to be moni-
tored by a government agency, viz., the Labor Bureau and its special 
division with responsibility to supervise and to resolve disputes.58  The 
numbers of negotiating obligations, some mentioned earlier, for clar-
ity can be organized under the following three categories. 
 
a. Fair and Consultative Representation.  The negotiating repre-
sentatives must “participate” in the negotiations59 after having con-
sulted with employees regarding negotiating topics60 and must accept 
inquires from their constituency, publicize the status of negotiations, 
collect opinion,61 and provide information concerning collective nego-
tiations.62 
 
 50. Id. arts. 37-38. 
 51. Id. arts. 39-41. 
 52. Id. art. 42. 
 53. PROVISIONS art. 44. 
 54. Id. art. 46. 
 55. Clarke , supra  note 2, at 246. 
 56. PROVISIONS art. 47. 
 57. Id. art. 48. 
 58. Id. art. 7. 
 59. Id. art. 25(1). 
 60. Id. art. 33(2). 
 61. Id. art. 25(2). 
 62. PROVISIONS art. 25(3). 
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b. Negotiating Duty.  Objective measures of negotiating include 
the following.  The negotiating representative must be legally author-
ized63 to conduct negotiations on behalf of the represented party’s in-
terests, must “not refuse” to respond to requests to engage in collec-
tive negotiations,64 and must “participate.”65  The negotiating 
representative must provide “information” concerning collective ne-
gotiations66 and determine the time and place for negotiations.67  The 
employer is prohibited from refusing the collective negotiations re-
quirements without “proper reason,” 68 and a violation of said provi-
sion is expressly subject to the Trade Union Law, which confirms in 
Article 53(4) that “[R]ejecting consultation on an equal footing with-
out justifiable reasons” is a violation.69  Subjective measures of the 
conduct of negotiating duty include “honesty,” “keeping promises,” 
“fair collaboration,” and “consideration of legal rights and interests 
for cooperation.”70 
The Provisions are based on and incorporate the Labor Law and 
the Trade Union Law that also set forth standards on negotiating 
conduct as well as duties of fair treatment of employees.71  Further-
more, Article 25(6) of the Provisions obligates the negotiating repre-
sentatives to those other obligations stipulated by laws, regulations 
and rules.72 
 
c. Fair Treatment of Employees.  While the 2004 Provisions do 
not directly regulate fair treatment of employees, said Provisions in-
corporate the Trade Union Law on the subject, including employees’ 
right to organize and join the union.  Article 3 of the 2001 Trade Un-
ion Law provides in pertinent part the following basic guarantee: 
[Employees] who rely on wages . . . regardless of their nationality, 
race, sex, occupation, religious beliefs or educational background, 
 
 63. Id. art. 19. 
 64. Id. art. 32. 
 65. Id. art. 25(1). 
 66. Id. art. 25(3). 
 67. Id. art. 33(4). 
 68. PROVISIONS art. 56. 
 69. TRADE UNION LAW art. 53(4). 
 70. PROVISIONS art. 5. 
 71. Id. art.1. 
 72. Id. art. 25(6). 
02_BROWN.DOC  3/1/2006   12:51 PM 
2006] CHINA’S COLLECTIVE CONTRACT PROVISIONS  45 
have the right to organize and join trade unions according to law.  
No organizations or individuals shall obstruct or restrict them.73 
Article 11 provides that: 
[T]rade union organizations at higher levels may dispatch their 
members to assist and guide the workers and staff members of enter-
prises to set up their trade unions, no units or individuals may ob-
struct their effort.74 
Article 50 instructs that if anyone violates Article 3 or 11 by obstruct-
ing employees in joining trade union organizations, or obstructing 
higher trade unions in assisting and guiding employees in preparation 
for establishing trade unions, then the violation shall be ordered to be 
corrected by the “administrative department for labor” (Labor Bu-
reau), with appeals to appropriate government offices.75  There is also 
possible criminal violation if there is violence or intimidation.76 
Article 51 prohibits anyone from retaliating against any staff 
member of a trade union by modifying the employee’s job.77  Said 
provision also prohibits insults, slander, or personal injury to any staff 
member of a trade union who performs his or her duties “according 
to law.”  Punishment for violations includes criminal prosecution or 
administrative sanctions by the public security (the police).78  Article 
52 provides that if an employee or a staff member of the union has his 
or her labor contract cancelled because of joining the trade union, 
there is entitlement to reinstatement with retroactive pay or an order 
by the Labor Bureau to pay “two times the amount of his annual in-
come.”79 
Article 53 prohibits obstructing the trade union in its work to or-
ganize employees to exert “(1) democratic rights through the con-
gress of the workers and staff members and other forms;” (2) unlaw-
fully “dissolving or merging trade union organizations;” and “(3) 
preventing a trade union from participating in the investigation into 
and solution of an accident causing job-related injuries or death to 
workers or staff members or other infringements upon the legitimate 
rights and interests of the workers and staff members.”80 
 
 73. TRADE UNION LAW art. 3 (emphasis added). 
 74. Id. art. 11 (emphasis added). 
 75. Id. art. 50. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. art. 51. 
 78. Id. 
 79. TRADE UNION LAW art. 52. 
 80. Id. art. 53 (emphasis added). 
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Employees who are negotiating representatives are protected by 
the 2004 Provision from retaliation.  For example, an employee who 
is a negotia ting representative cannot have his or her labor contract 
terminated when it expires during performance of representative ob-
ligations, rather it must be automatically extended up to the comple-
tion of his or her representative obligations.81  Such employee can 
only be terminated upon a sufficient showing by the employer of seri-
ous violation of duty or employer rules.82  Similarly, an employer shall 
not adjust or remove the employee’s working position without proper 
reason,83 and the employee shall be regarded as performing normal 
work when participating in collective negotiations.84  Moreover, addi-
tional provisions of the Trade Union Law likewise provide protec-
tions for trade union funds, and proscribe improper conduct by trade 
union staff members against employees or the trade union.85 
The negotiating representative also has two affirmative obliga-
tions under Article 26 of the Provisions.  The representative has a 
duty to “safeguard the normal order of work and production and shall 
not adopt any action of threatening, buying popular support and de-
ception.”86  The first part appears to obligate the union representative 
to act affirmatively to avoid or end of any employee disruption of ser-
vices, while the second part seems to place an obligation of proper 
conduct upon both employee and employer representatives, as lead-
ers in negotiations.  The second affirmative obligation is to keep the 
commercial secrets of the employer acquired during the collective ne-
gotiations.87 
Disputes relating to “proper conduct” regarding the objective 
and subjective aspects of the negotiations, including disagreements or 
impasses on proposals, are to be resolved by the Labor Bureau.88  
Other disputes that relate to retaliation against employee representa-
tive’s rights, and under Articles 27 and 28, are to be resolved before 
the local labor arbitration commission.89 
 
 81. PROVISIONS art. 28. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. art. 27. 
 85. TRADE UNION LAW arts. 54-55. 
 86. PROVISIONS art. 26. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. art. 49.  This is for “any disputes” which occur during the collective negotiation. 
 89. Id. art. 29. 
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II.  CHINESE CONDITIONS AFFECTING COLLECTIVE 
NEGOTIATIONS 
China’s recent history and economic growth both explain the de-
velopments occurring in this area of labor law as well as help define 
the direction that must be taken.  With the transition from the “iron 
rice bowl system” to labor contracts, the effects of moving China from 
a socialist planned economy to a socialist market economy have taken 
hold.  Privatization, layoffs, new management strategies emphasizing 
profits and competition have produced both “wage consciousness” 
and feelings of unfairness in view of regional wage disparities, occu-
pational wage gaps, unequal job opportunities, and sagging labor and 
security safety nets. 
The economic growth phenomenon has produced a 100 to 150 
million person “floating population” seeking to earn their share of the 
growth.  It also has produced national scandals of employers refusing 
to pay the wages of migrant workers, presently an underclass in 
China.  Coal miners are dying by the thousands each year due to un-
safe working conditions.  Consequently, the issue of better enforce-
ment of the labor protections provided in the labor laws is on the la-
bor reform agenda. 
China is at a crossroads.  On the one hand, it has the necessary 
ingredients to make its labor law system work much better than it 
does; on the other hand, its history of labor relations has seemed to 
blend with the forces of economic development, and it seems unsure 
if it makes the choice to better enforce its labor laws, whether it will 
be placed at an internationally competitive disadvantage.  Employers 
who might otherwise follow the labor laws are in a quandary; why 
spend the money to follow the labor laws if it doesn’t matter?90 
Can higher labor standards negotiated into collective contracts 
provide a mechanism inside the enterprise by which employees’ labor 
rights could be better enforced?  This, of course, is a different ques-
tion than, will they be enforced, especially since rights under collec-
tive contract enforcement use the same legal mechanism as for statu-
tory rights. 
A. Economic Transition 
To understand the nuances of current labor relations in China, 
one must put it into the context of China’s fast-moving economic 
 
 90. Clarke , supra  note 2, at 248. 
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conditions.  When economic transition moved from policies establish-
ing special economic zones of development into policies transforming 
all of China’s economy from a socialist planned economy to a socialist 
market economy, social and economic ramifications were expected 
and occurred.  With a market economy came competition, the need 
for more flexible management, and the quest for profits—which re-
quired cutting costs.  For China’s labor-intensive industrial economy, 
this usually meant keeping labor costs low.  Privatization and com-
petitive measures brought layoffs (especially in the already over-
staffed State Owned Enterprises (SOEs)) and kept wages and bene-
fits to bare minimums.  With individual control waning, conditions 
lent themselves to workers’ economic improvement through collec-
tive negotiations. 
Wage concerns of workers came of increasing importance as 
widening gaps occurred in the annual growth of real wages versus 
GNP, with great numbers of workers feeling left out.  The record re-
flects that China’s impressive economic growth in GNP for over a 
decade is not matched in the real wage growth of workers, which 
roughly keeps pace with rates of inflation.91  The lawful minimum 
wage in China varies by locales according to local economic factors, 
as is the national mandate under China’s Regulations on Minimum 
Wage.92  According to the Regulation, China seeks to accommodate 
an international labor standard that sets local minimum wages within 
the range of 40 percent to 60 percent of the average wage standard in 
the locality.93  One source states that in 1993 China’s average mini-
mum wages met or exceeded the 40 percent minimum, but by the late 
1990s there had been a steady and consistent erosion below that mini-
 
 91. By comparing ILO official statistics (ILO LABORSTA database) to the rate of infla-
tion, it is argued that there was at least a relative wage decline of Chinese manufacturing work-
ers.  See Anita Chan, A Race to the Bottom, 46 CHINA PERSPECTIVES 41, 42 (2003).  According 
to data obtained from ILO LABORSTA database , in 1993 the average wages at all economic 
enterprises was about 281 yuan/month and in 2002 it was 1,035 yuan/month.  Not surprisingly, 
the lowest average in 2002, 533 yuan/month, was in the agricultural services area, whereas the 
highest was in the financial sector (1,595 yuan/month).  In manufacturing, the average was 917 
yuan/month.  See ILO LABORSTA, Table 5A Wages, by Economic Activity , available at 
http://laborsta.ilo.org/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2005). 
 92. ZUIDI GONGZI GUIDING [hereinafter REGULATIONS ON MINIMUM WAGE] art. 6 (Jan. 
20, 2004), http://www.chinacourt.org/flwk/show1.php?file_id=91496 (last visited Nov. 1, 2005); 
see also LABOR LAW, arts. 48-49. 
 93. REGULATIONS ON MINIMUM WAGE, Attachment Section 2.  Calculations Methods of 
Minimum Wage Standard.  The 40%-60% range is the international standard used when calcu-
lating minimum wage. 
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mum.94  For Foreign Invested Enterprises (FIEs), in addition to 
minimum wage requirements, by legal edict the average wage of a 
FIE should not fall below the local average rate in the same indus-
try.95 
Increasing wage gaps also concerns workers.  Some Chinese citi-
zens were able to realize Deng Xiaoping’s famous slogan “to get rich 
is glorious” much faster than others, and with economic reforms came 
great wage diversity between regions, between urban and rural, and 
between management and labor.  In the year 2000, regional variations 
of average income ranged from 1,544 yuan/month in Shanghai to 582 
yuan/month in Chonqing.96  Minimum wage variations between local 
governments ranged from 620 yuan/month in Nanjing to 545 
yuan/month in Beijing.97 
Observations by World Bank President Wolfensohn about 
China’s wage gaps have raised alarms; he stated that the likely conse-
 
 94. Chan, supra, note 91, at 42.  In Beijing in 2000 the average wage was reported at 
1,362.50 yuan/month and the minimum wage at 412 yuan/month.  See Beijing Labor and Social 
Security Bureau, Guanyu Tiaozheng 2000 Nian Beijingshi Zuidi Gongzi Biaozhun de Tongzhi 
[Notice on 2000 Beijing Minimal Wage Guideline] (Jun. 27, 2000), 
http://www.bjld.gov.cn/tszl/zdshbz/t20010907_2142.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2005).  Beijing’s 
minimum wage in September, 2004 was reported at 545 yuan/month.  See Beijing Labor and So-
cial Security Bureau, Guanyu Tiaozheng 2004 Nian Beijingshi Zuidi Gongzi Biaozhun de Tong-
zhi [Notice on 2004 Beijing Minimal Wage Guideline] (Jun. 30, 2004), 
http://www.bjld.gov.cn/tszl/zdshbz/t20040924_402234257.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2005).  The 
exact average wage of workers earning in China is difficult to ascertain, and it varies by political 
districts.  According to a 2004 survey conducted by one research institute under the Develop-
ment Research Center of the State Council (DRCSC), 70.8 percent of Chinese urban employees 
earn 800 to 2,500 yuan (US$96.74 to US$302. 3) monthly.  See Chinese Urban Employees Earn 
More, CHINA DAILY, May 31, 2004, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-
05/31/content_335250.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2005). 
 95. WAISHANG TOUZI QIYE GONGZI SHOURU GUANLI ZANXING BANFA  [INTERIM 
MEASURES ON FIE WAGES], art. 4 (Feb. 14, 1997), 
http://www.chinacourt.org/flwk/show1.php?file_id=27601 (last visited Mar. 19, 2005). 
 96. Chan, supra note 91, at 41, 45 (Figure 2). 
 97. See Jiangsu Xinwen [Jiangsu News], Qiye Zuidi Gongzi Zuoqi Shangtiao Nanjingshi 
Feng Sange Cenci Tiaozheng  [Nanjing City Increases Minimal Wages], 
http://www.jschina.com.cn/gb/jschina/news/jiangsu/in&co/userobject1ai480595.html (last visited 
Mar. 19, 2005) (citing Nanjing Labor and Social Security Bureau, Guanyu Tiaozheng Nanjingshi 
Qiye Zuidi Gongzi Biaozhun de Tongzhi [Notice on Nanjing Minimal Wage] (2004); Beijing La-
bor and Social Security Bureau, Notice on Beijing Minimal Wage Guideline (Jun. 30, 2004).  For 
a more detailed report on the changes of local minimal wage standards, see Bufen Shengshi 
Shangtiao Zuidi Gongzi Biaozhun [Provinces Increase Minimal Wage Standards], XINHUA 
NEWS AGENCY, July 27, 2004, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2004-
07/27/content_1654505.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2005).  See also Compendium of Country In-
formation on Wages, Benefits, Poverty Line and Meeting Workers Needs: China 2003 , United 
States Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs at II-20, 
http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/media/reports/oiea/wagestudy/begin.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2005). 
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quence is social unrest.98  According to the World Bank, China in the 
past 20 years has achieved great progress in poverty reduction (insuf-
ficient food and clothing) from 200 million people to 29 million, but 
Wolfensohn pointed out that China still has 400 million people living 
on less than $2/day USD.  Incomes are rising, but the rate of increase 
of the urban areas is rising two times faster than the rural increase.  
President Wolfensohn estimated the wage gap in 10 years will be one 
of the highest in the world; and he noted that in 2003 China had 10 
million citizens engaged in protests, not only over labor issues (such 
as layoffs and wages), but also over rising rural taxes and forced relo-
cation in urban areas.99 
Another wage gap exists between workers and managers.  A re-
cent survey by the State Council has identified that sixty-one percent 
of Chinese enterprises were paid three to fifteen times higher than 
employees, while twenty-one percent were paid fifteen to fifty times 
higher, and fifteen percent of the FIEs were paid fifty times more.100 
A December 2003 government survey in China states that sev-
enty-two percent of China’s nearly 100 million migrant workers are 
owed pay.  The Construction Ministry estimates that workers in 2003 
were owed over “$12 billion in wages” by their employers even 
though the law requires wages be paid at least monthly, and estimates 
put the unpaid debts to migrants at one-third of the value of produc-
tion in construction and real estate industries.101  Those involved say 
 
 98. David Murphy, The Dangers of too Much Success, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 
Jun. 10, 2004, at 29. 
 99. Id. at 30.  CCP’s Outlook magazine reported recently that three million people staged 
58,000 protests on labor issues across China in 2003.  See also Labor Activists Detect Change and 
China Repression, REUTERS NEWS, Jan. 13, 2005, http://www.china -
labour.org.hk/iso/article.adp?article_id=6177&category_name=China% 
20Labour%20Bulletin%20in%20the%20News (last visited Mar. 19, 2005). 
 100. Laozong Yuangong Shouru Chaju Zuida Chao Wushibei [Manager Earns Fifty Times 
More], GUANGZHOU DAILY, (Apr. 25, 2004), A2 (citing Guowuyuan Fazhan Yanjiu Zhongxin 
[The Development Research Center of the State Council], Zhongguo Qiye Renliziyuan Guanli 
Diaocha Baogao [Human Resource Report] (2004)).  News article available at 
http://gzdaily.dayoo.com/gb/content/2004-04/25/content_1517025.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 
2005).  For Chinese senior managers, the law recognizes that their actual income (including 
dividends) may be much higher than the nominal income wage payment under an employment 
contract.  However, the difference between actual and nominal income of a Chinese senior 
manager is subject to the supervision of the union and may be used for the benefits of other em-
ployees’ welfare, such as housing or pension.  See INTERIM MEASURES ON FIE WAGES art. 10. 
 101. Anthony Kuhn, A High Price to Pay for a Job, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 
Jan. 22, 2004, at 30-32.  Other commentators note these violations of labor laws have caused a 
labor shortage in Guangdong (which account for an estimated 40 percent of the back pay cases 
in China in 2003), as potential workers stay away.  When this is added to demographic trends 
02_BROWN.DOC  3/1/2006   12:51 PM 
2006] CHINA’S COLLECTIVE CONTRACT PROVISIONS  51 
most of the workers do not have formal labor contracts as the law re-
quires.  It was reported that Beijing Municipal Government in the 
first six months of 2004 helped 110,000 migrant workers recover 290 
million yuan ($35 million USD) of unpaid wages, causing the first de-
cline in labor disputes in Beijing since 2000.102 
When adding up some of the ill side -effects of economic reforms, 
such as slow-rising wages, widening wage gaps, and unpaid wages of 
migrant workers (who make up the “floating population” of 100 to 
150 million Chinese citizens)—with each affected employee seeking 
to find his or her share of the new economic development, one can 
understand why the central government has had as a high priority 
putting a social security safety net in place with accompanying labor 
law protections.  This effort brought into existence the 1994 Labor 
Law which broadly outlined labor standards requirements.  By 2004, 
many of the standards had been more formally enacted into specific 
laws and regulations including new regulations on minimum wage and 
hours.  Notwithstanding the progress in legislation, employees con-
tinued to demand that the laws be made to work and some collective 
protests have taken place demanding improved benefits. 
B. Trade Union’s Role  
1. Emerging Role.  The path was clearer for the government-
endorsed union, the ACFTU, in the early days of the People’s Re-
public of China when, “within the state socialist system, the interests 
of both management and the trade union were supposed to be identi-
cal and their identification was reinforced by the subordination of 
both to the Party-state.”103  While the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) in recent years during the economic transition has stepped 
back somewhat from seeking to directly influence management’s mi-
cro-market decisions, it continues to maintain a close policy relation-
ship with the ACFTU.  Although the union is set up as an independ-
 
that predict a shrinkage of entry -level, low-skilled industrial workers, it is argued this will trans-
late into more “ba rgaining power” for those entering into the labor force in the future.  Dali L. 
Yang, China’s Looming Labor Shortage, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Jan.-Feb. 2005, at 
20, 22. 
 102. Li Jing, Beijing Government Urges Employers to Pay Up, CHINA DAILY, Sep. 14, 2004, 
at 3, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-09/14/content_374270.htm (last visited Mar. 
19, 2005).  See also Guoyu jishu gongren de diaoyan baogao [Analyzing Labor Shortage and 
Skilled Labor Shortage], MOLSS, Sept. 8, 2004, available at 
http://www.molss.gov.cn/news/2004/0908b.htm. 
 103. Clarke , supra  note 3, at 241. 
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ent and autonomous body, like the All China Women’s Federation, it 
is maintained as a quasi-governmental entity.104  The ACFTU is the 
exclusive trade union in China and any new union must be affiliated 
with it.105 
China’s dramatic economic development in the past three dec-
ades has caused the ACFTU to emerge as an organization which un-
der law plays “a dual role in the transition towards a market econ-
omy.”106  In that dual role of promoting both employee interests and 
economic reforms and social stability, it has also witnessed some in-
ternal discussion, if not struggles, between those in the union who 
want the ACFTU to be more active in the advocacy and representa-
tion of the employees’ interests, and those in the CCP who want the 
union to be more responsive to the needs of society for social stabil-
ity.107  In practice, as will be discussed, some observers feel the 
ACFTU’s current predominant function in the workplace is a man-
agement function. 
2. Legal Authority.  Chinese labor law in fact requires the 
ACFTU to serve two masters.  In addition to representing “the le-
gitimate rights and interests of the workers,”108 it must also assist the 
government and the CCP in “upholding the overall rights and inter-
ests of the whole nation.”109 
As to the union’s advocacy role on behalf of the employees, the 
ACFTU is to provide guidance and assistance to workers on obtain-
ing individual labor and collective contracts and to advance workers’ 
interests against the employers’ regarding compliance with a variety 
of health, safety, and labor laws.110  In the event of a work stoppage or 
slowdown, the ACFTU’s responsibility is to both represent the em-
ployees’ interests and to assist the employer in properly dealing with 
the matter to restore the normal order of production, thus in effect, 
mediating solutions to the dispute.111  The union distributes this bifur-
cated loyalty also by serving on intra-enterprise mediation commit-
 
 104. See TRADE UNION LAW art. 4. 
 105. Id. art. 11. 
 106. Clarke, supra  note 3, at 241. 
 107. TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 4, at 115. 
 108. TRADE UNION LAW art. 2. 
 109. Id. art. 6. 
 110. Id. arts. 20-25. 
 111. Id. art. 27. 
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tees and the tripartite Labor Arbitration Commissions, both of which 
seek to resolve disputes over employees’ labor rights.112 
While conducting its work “independently,” the union is admon-
ished to “concentrate on the focus of economic construction, adhere 
to the socialist road,”113 and, as its basic responsibility, “safeguard the 
rights and interests of workers.”114  Additionally, Article 7 of the 
Trade Union Law requires that “trade unions should mobilize and 
organize employees to participate in the economic construction posi-
tively, to complete production duties and working duties with great 
efforts.  Trade unions shall educate employees . . . to build disciplined 
employee groups.”115 
The 2001 Trade Union Law protects the union and the employ-
ees against improper interference with the rights granted under this 
law, including the rights of employees and trade unions to engage in 
lawful union activity.116  It also provides remedies for certain viola-
tions, discussed above under “fair treatment of employees.”117  The 
1994 Labor Law obligates the trade unions of various levels to “safe-
guard the legitimate rights and interests of the workers and exercise 
supervision over the employers with regard to the implementation of 
labour discipline and the laws and regulations.”118 
C. Prior Experience with Collective Negotiations 
Recent studies in China on industrial relations aspects of collec-
tive negotiations concluded before the new 2004 Provisions have ex-
amined SOEs, private enterprises, and FIEs and point out some of 
the deficiencies, which the 2004 Provisions addressed, dealing with 
process, content, and the role of the trade union.  First, with regard to 
process, the Clarke study observes the following: 
[T]he system of collective consultation is not merely a means for 
the state to intervene in enterprises, but nor does it provide the 
framework for a new industrial relations system in China.  At the 
present stage of its development, it is essentially a development of 
the anachronistic system of “workers’ participation in manage-
ment” and a (rather ineffective) adjunct to the juridical regulation 
of labour relations, providing a means to remind employers and 
 
 112. LABOR LAW arts. 80-81. 
 113. TRADE UNION LAW art. 4. 
 114. Id. art. 6. 
 115. Id. art. 7. 
 116. Id. art. 3. 
 117. Id. arts. 50-53. 
 118. LABOR LAW art. 88. 
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trade union officers of their legal obligations and, in principle 
though not in practice, a means by which industrial conflict can be 
defused by channeling it into juridical procedures.119 
The authors feel there will be no change “until the enterprise trade 
union develops into an organization that, in its structure and practice, 
disengages from management to represent the interests of its mem-
bers.”120  Another recent study concludes on a similar note: 
The system of collective contracts, theoretically designed by the su-
perior authorities as an effective mechanism to help adjust labour 
relations, has undergone major revision when it comes to be ap-
plied in practice.  Even though the collective contract could be con-
cluded between the management and the union in many enter-
prises, the whole process of consultation is little more than 
administrative compliance with quotas assigned from above.121 
Next, with regard to content of the collective contracts, the Clarke 
study concludes the following: 
Employers remain reluctant to incorporate any substantive detail in 
the collective contract, so that the contract adds little or nothing to 
the existing legal regulation of the terms and conditions and em-
ployment.  At best, the collective contract provides a means of re-
minding employers of their legal obligations and monitoring the 
implementation of labour legislation in the workplace.122 
In its analysis of the content of collective contracts of SOEs, the 
Chang study observes that there were three categories of contract 
clauses in the agreements: the first deals with principles and formali-
ties, such as who are the parties, etc.; the second contains the clauses 
to be implemented by the parties; the third category deals with com-
mitments of the parties and duration.123  The study shows the second 
category of implementation clauses took up an average of about 70 
percent of the total number of clauses.  Further examination reveals 
over 60 percent of these clauses were defined by the labor law (usu-
ally a duplication), 20 to 30 percent were made in reference to the law 
(e.g., time schedule for implementing certain required female medical 
examinations), and about 10 percent of the clauses, on average, dealt 
with subjects relating to improvement of the employees’ benefits.124 
 
 119. Clarke, supra  note 3, at 251. 
 120. Id. at 251-52. 
 121. TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 206. 
 122. Clarke, supra note 4, at 250. 
 123. TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 193-94. 
 124. Id. 
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Interestingly, the Clarke study observes that wage negotiations 
were often conducted separately from the collective contract negotia-
tions, with the negotiated wages reflecting the minimum wages at the 
enterprise.  Likely, this bifurcated approach may be because wages 
are often revised annually, whereas a collective contract may stay in 
effect for two or three years.125 
Lastly, the controversial role of the trade union has drawn much 
attention in recent studies.  The primary hindrance is continually 
identified as the employees not having a real advocate for their inter-
ests under the current system in China.  It appears to some that “the 
predominant functions of the trade union at the workplace still tend 
to be management functions.”126  Clarke’s study concluded that the 
following was the principal function of the trade union: 
[To] “take economic development as its central task,” encouraging 
workers to increase productivity, enforcing labor discipline and 
conducting extensive propaganda on behalf of management.  ‘Pro-
tecting the rights and interests of employees’ is at best interpreted 
as monitoring managerial practice to ensure that it conforms to all 
the relevant laws and regulations, and implementing the social and 
welfare policy of the enterprise—visiting sick workers, dealing with 
personal problems, distributing benefits, organizing picnics and ar-
ranging celebrations.127 
The concept of the trade union being something other than “just a 
branch of management” and of representing and protecting employee 
interests “in opposition to those of the employer is something unfa-
miliar, if not entirely alien, to [the union’s] traditional practice and to 
[its] traditional conception of [that] role.”128 
Part of the explanation is the identity of the trade union officials.  
A typical official at the enterprise level has been described as follows: 
Trade union officers are drawn largely from the ranks of manage-
ment.  A full-time trade union president is paid by the employer 
and normally enjoys the status (and salary) of a deputy general di-
rector of the company; the personal careers of union leaders re-
volve around the positions of party cadre, union leader and enter-
prise manager; they are usually members of the Board of Directors 
and/or the Supervisory Board of the company; and they (rightly) 
regard themselves as members of the senior management team.  
 
 125. Clarke, supra note 3, at 247. 
 126. Id. at 242. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
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Whether or not there is a formal election of the trade union chair, 
the latter is normally appointed by management.129 
Clarke’s study found many examples where the “real parties” in in-
terest were obfuscated; it illustrated the often lock-step harmony of 
interests: 
In some enterprises senior members of management participated in 
the negotiations on the trade union side.  In one enterprise the fi-
nance director was a member of the trade union in the consultation 
committee; in another a senior financial manager participated on 
the trade union side in an advisory capacity.  At the same time, the 
trade union president, as a member of the Board of Directors or 
Supervisory Board, usually participates in the formulation of man-
agement’s response to the trade union proposals for the collective 
contract.130 
Left out of the equation is whether the employees feel their interests 
are being properly negotiated and protected; although theoretically, 
and under the law, they can refuse to ratify the proposed final agree-
ment.131 
In prior years, the CCP would have played a more direct and ac-
tive role to ensure the employer and union worked “harmoniously,” 
but in recent years the CCP works more indirectly, usually through 
the trade union.  In that respect, the above study shows that “at least 
five of the 12 trade union presidents also held the post of party secre-
tary or deputy party secretary.”132 
This ambiguity of who is the employer and who is the union 
(though not necessarily who is the boss) is further complicated by 
China’s legacy of SOE’s being units of larger integrated bureaucracies 
in the planned economy, the periodic use of Workers’ Congresses, 
and the absence of unions in many enterprises across China.  The tra-
ditional SOEs utilized “employers” and trade unions as agents for 
controlling bureaucratic entities of an economic plan.  With economic 
reforms and new laws, legal responsibility is increasingly fixed on the 
“employing unit”—the employer.  However, at the enterprise level, 
there is little meaningful influence to prevent the union and the em-
ployer from “wearing each other’s hats” and in the process basically 
becoming the same voice. 
The Worker’s Congresses, set up in SOEs to provide workers’ 
democratic management, are not used, particularly in private enter-
 
 129. Id. at 242-43. 
 130. Id. at 246. 
 131. See PROVISIONS art. 37. 
 132. Clarke, supra  note 3, at 243. 
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prises.  However, when used in SOEs, they can be one more “player” 
in the complexities of relationships in the negotiations relating to the 
welfare of the employees and the enterprises.  They were re-
established in 1981 to provide for workers at the enterprise level to 
participate in management.133  The Congress is supposed to meet at 
least once a year and its executive body, the trade union, generally 
executes its functions.  These functions include review and approval 
or disapproval of management’s plans, appointments, and decisions.  
Its efficacy in practical terms is suspect, and, post-1979 history and 
rapidly changing governance structures in China seem to have over-
taken its usefulness.  For example, the current Corporation Law 
greatly diluted and reduced the power and role of Worker’s Con-
gresses to merely “exercise democratic management”134 and “democ-
ratic supervision.”135  The former “legal” functions of the Workers’ 
Congress to appraise and supervise the cadres and elect the Director 
of the enterprise are deleted and replaced by a corporate board of di-
rectors and supervisory committee.136  Whether this will be a fatal 
blow to the Workers’ Congresses in SOEs remains to be seen. 
Another emerging role of trade unions in collective negotiations, 
observed in the pre-2004 studies, is the introduction and possible in-
stitutionalization of industrial unions.  Due to the increased presence 
of small to medium FIEs, Privately Owned Enterprises (POEs), and 
Town and Village Enterprises (TVEs) in the new socialist market 
economy, a large number of workers coming from rural or less indus-
trialized areas of China are being employed, and, as is well docu-
mented, their labor rights are exploited.137  The unionization rate in 
these enterprises is very low, and there is little expectation of labor 
law enforcement, let alone negotiation of collective contracts.  It has 
been suggested that these largely overseas-funded enterprises do not 
necessarily resist collective negotiations, rather they see unions and 
negotiations as “irrelevant” and the government and the CCP as ei-
ther reluctant or impotent to induce the enterprises to sign agree-
 
 133. Quanmin Suoyouzhi Gongye Qiye Zhigong Daibiao Dahui Tiaoli [Regulation on 
State-Owned Enterprise Workers’ Congress] arts. 1-6 (1986), 
http://www.chinacourt.org/flwk/show1.php?file_id=5586 (last visited Mar. 19, 2005). 
 134. ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO GONGSI FA [CORPORATION LAW] art. 16 (1999), 
http://www.chinacourt.org/flwk/show1.php?file_id=96089 (last visited Nov. 10, 2005). 
 135. Id. arts. 16, 55. 
 136. TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 1. 
 137. See Clarke, supra  note 3, at 248. 
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ments.138  The ACFTU has taken notice, and as early as 1996 in a 
document issued jointly by then Ministry of Labor, the ACFTU, the 
SETC, and China Enterprise Confederation an approval was given 
for the use of “professional or industrial unions” of the primary trade 
union to negotiate collective contracts on behalf of the employees at 
these various enterprises.139 
Pursuant to this policy of using industrial unions, the ACFTU 
has reportedly established these types of local trade union organiza-
tions in 25 provinces since 1996.140  The agreements under these in-
dustrial unions cover all of the private enterprises in one district or 
industrial sector.  The union signs the agreements with the “employ-
ers’ associations” at the same levels.  These “associations” are de-
scribed as “established under the relevant government departments 
rather than genuine employers’ organizations.”141  Clarke’s study, un-
der pre-2004 Provisions, indicates that in at least one area, Chengdu 
(where there were some 30 agreements), there has been an increase 
in union membership following the agreements.142  An added bonus 
for workers in Chengdu is that the city-level ACFTU had “success-
fully been taking cases to the City Arbitration Committee when the 
employers had failed to abide by the agreement.”143  A downside 
noted, was that it worked because of government intervention (as 
“employers’ associations” were local government authorities super-
vising local private enterprises) rather than as voluntary regulation of 
collective negotiations by private employers.144 
There were some positive aspects observed in the pre-2004 col-
lective negotiation process.  The “existing system provides an effec-
tive method of soliciting the reactions of employees to management 
proposals;” however, due to the great amount of discretion a union 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. TAYLOR, supra  note 4, at 196.  The Trade Union Law states, “[E]nterprises of some 
industries or industries of similar nature may set up national or regional industrial unions as cir-
cumstances require.”  TRADE UNION LAW art. 10. 
 140. Clarke, supra  note 3, at 249.  A union in Hangzhou reportedly had recent guarantees of 
800 yuan per month through collective contracts.  Interestingly, a comment by Fu Nanbao, 
president of the trade union in Xinhe, said that with the help of the trade union and the new 
wage negotiating system, “the relationship between employers and workers has gone from being 
‘adversarial’ to ‘cooperative.’”  Shao Xiaoyi, Negotiated Salary System Saves Industry, CHINA 
DAILY, Feb. 24, 2005, at 5,  http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-
02/24/content_418852.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2005). 
 141. Clarke, supra  note 3, at 249. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
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has, the ability of employees to have an effective channel to articulate 
their own aspirations is more limited.145  In some cases involving large 
FIEs who wish to be “good citizens,” such as Beijing Jeep Ltd., Bab-
cock & Wilcox Company, and Shanghai Volkswagen Automotive 
Company Ltd., there have been comprehensive collective contracts, 
though not necessarily prompted by the laws.146  Willing unions have 
also evidenced their abilities “to design sophisticated negotiation 
strategies involving high, medium and bottom lines for their wage ne-
gotiation.”147 
III.  COMPARATIVE REFERENCES: ILO AND UNITED 
STATES 
Before further analyzing the 2004 Provisions, some references of 
ILO labor standards and U.S. approaches are provided for context 
and measurement of China’s collective negotiation under the new 
Provisions. 
A. ILO Labor Standards 
By providing labor standards reached by a consensus of its some 
178-member states, the ILO presents countries a choice.  Though 
there are competitive advantages in world markets to maintain low 
labor standards so as to maximize profits, support economic devel-
opment, and attract foreign investment, there still exists a strong 
movement among enlightened countries to undertake labor reforms 
for the clear purpose of providing their citizens a safe and decent 
working environment. 
In 1998, the ILO put forth conventions of eight “core labor stan-
dards” by which it will take measure of countries’ labor conditions 
and practices under national laws.148  Nearly eighty-five percent of the 
 
 145. Id. at 245. 
 146. TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 202-03. 
 147. Id. at 203. 
 148. International Labour Organization Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights 
at Work, Gen. Conf. Res., 86th Sess. (June 19, 1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 1233 (1998).  From 
the Copenhagen Social Summit in 1995 to the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work, the ILO has pressed for an international consensus on the content of the core 
labor standards.  In 1998, the ILO adopted the Convention concerning the Prohibition and Im-
mediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (Convention No. 182).  
It also adopted its Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work together with a 
follow-up procedure based upon technical cooperation and reporting.  The  principles have been 
incorporated into codes of conduct by the private sector and also used as a basis for action by 
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members have ratified six of the core standards, and nearly sixty-five 
percent, including European nations, have ratified all eight.149 
China, as a “developing” country, continues to progress in its la-
bor law reforms, and it has ratified three of the core labor standards, 
and overall ratified 23 conventions, and has become a member of 
ILO’s governing board.150  By comparison, the United States has rati-
fied two of the core standards and 14 conventions overall.151  Of 
course, the issue always remaining is how well the existing national 
labor laws and practices accord with ILO standards. 
Relevant to the issue of collective negotiation, this Article exam-
ines two of the core labor standards—Freedom of Association and 
Protection of the Right to Organise (Convention No. 87) and the 
Right to Organise and Collectively Bargain (Convention No. 98).152  
Neither China nor the United States has ratified these two conven-
tions. 
1. Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organ-
ize.  In the United States, there are nearly 16 million unionized work-
ers, consisting of about 8 percent of the workers in the private sector 
and about 36 percent in the government sector. 153  The primary fed-
eral labor law in this area is the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA), which guarantees the right to freedom of association, the 
right to join unions, to bargain collectively, and to engage in “con-
 
various regional organizations.  See Dinah Shelton, Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized 
World, 25 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 273, 306 (2002).  
 149. See Ratifications of the ILO Fundamental Conventions as of 11 Feb 2005 , 
http://webfusion.ilo.org/public/db/standards/normes/appl/appl-ratif8conv.cfm?Lang=EN (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2005). 
 150. For a list of ratification, see ILOLEX, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/ratifce.pl?China 
(last visited Nov. 1, 2005); China Labour E-Bulletin Issue No. 8, Editor’s Note (July 2, 2002), 
http://www.china -labour.org.hk/iso/newsletter_details.adp? newsletter_id=41 (last visited Mar. 
19, 2005) (The ACFTU won a seat in the Worker’s Group of the ILO’s Governing Body in June 
2002). 
 151. See ILOLEX, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/ratifce.pl?(United+States) (last visited 
Nov. 1, 2005).  
 152. Freedom of association is defined in the Freedom of Association and Protection of the 
Right to Organise Convention (Convention No. 87) and the Right to Organize and Collective 
Bargaining Convention (Convention No. 98).  
 153. “In 2004, 12.5 percent of all wage and salary workers were union members, down from 
12.9 percent in 2003 . . . . The union membe rship rate has steadily declined from a high of 20.1 
percent in 1983 . . . .  About 36 percent of government workers were union me mbers in 2004, 
compared with about 8 percent of workers in private-sector industries.”  See Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Union Members Summary (Jan. 27, 2005), 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm. 
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certed” activity, including strikes.  The violations of the right to asso-
ciate under the NLRA include harassment, surveillance, threats, and 
discharge.  Such practices are deemed “unfair labor practices,” and 
the law provides remedies. 
China’s only trade union, the ACFTU, according to top union of-
ficial Chairperson Zhang Junjiu, a member of the Politburo, had 134 
million trade union members in 2003 out of about 250 million urban 
workers, which represented about less than 60% of the employees 
(though union membership in private and foreign-invested sectors is 
estimated to be less than 20%).154  New amendments to the Trade Un-
ion Law stipulate that all enterprises with 25 or more employees must 
establish a labor union and negotiate on matters of importance to 
employees, and there are legal protections for the right to organize.155 
In China, although there is a right to associate  and form a trade 
union, it is not necessarily one of the employees’ choices because in 
all cases the union must be affiliated with the ACFTU, which exer-
cises leadership over the subordinate levels.156  The ACFTU, since the 
founding of the People’s Republic of China, has had a close working 
relationship with the government and the CCP.  This relationship, in 
very recent years, shows evidence of undergoing some loosening in 
practice as to the role the union plays in labor relations and employee 
advocacy.  However, while the role may “morph,” the law is clear, as 
stated in China’s reservation to the U.N. Covenant on Economic, So-
cial, and Cultural Rights, Article 8.1(a), which limits the right of 
choice of unions to the laws of China (which do not permit it).157  Ac-
cording to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
(ICFTU), there are numbers of reports of China prohibiting attempts 
to create independent trade unions, which are in violation of Chinese 
 
 154. Quanguo Gonghui Huiyuan Dadao Yidiansan Yi Ren, Chuang Lishi Zuigao Shuiping 
[Union Membership Reaches New Historical Peak], Xinghua News Agency, Nov. 11, 2002, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2002-11/11/content_625980.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 
2005). 
 155. TRADE UNION LAW art. 10.  See also id. arts. 19-22 (supporting that legal protection is 
the practical consequence of Article 10 since all enterprises with 25 or more employees must 
establish a labor union, and that the workers, through a union, can voice their opinions on im-
portant matters) 
 156. See id. arts. 10-11.  Approval is a requisite of affiliation. 
 157. Aaron N. Lehl, Note, China’s Trade Union System Under the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Is China in Compliance with Article 8?, 21 U. HAW. L. 
REV. 203, 205, 236 (1999).  
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laws, with violators suffering penalties of criminal and/or administra-
tive detainment, or sometimes even psychiatric detainment.158 
2. Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining .  Also under the 
ILO labor standards is the right to engage in collective bargaining 
(implicitly including the right to strike), which derives naturally from 
the freedom of association.159  In the United States, the NLRA again 
is the primary law granting this right to private employees.  Collective 
bargaining in the United States usually involves vigorous negotiations 
and exchanges of proposals with the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB), the administrative body supervising the employer and union 
to ensure they conduct their negotiations fairly and in good faith, 
without committing unfair labor practices, as discussed below.  The 
NLRB is, in many ways, a model agency for administrative enforce-
ment, backed by the power of the courts to enforce its remedies.  
However, its effectiveness is tempered by backlogs and inadequate 
statutory penalties. 
American workers and labor unions feel strongly that there must 
be a right to strike so as to permit them to counter the economic 
power and pressure of the employers.  However, though there is a 
statutory right to strike in the private sector, case-law interpretation 
of that statute permits employers to replace striking workers perma-
nently.160  Most public sector employees are prohibited from striking 
 
 158. See ICFTU, China, People’s Republic of: Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union 
Rights (2004), http://www.icftu.org/displaydocument.asp?Index=991219483&Language=EN (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2005). 
 159. “For the Committee of Experts, [under the ILO], although the right to strike is not 
mentioned explicitly in Convention No. 87 [Freedom of Associa tion], it derives from Article 3, 
which sets forth the right of organizations to organize their activities and to formulate their pro-
grammes.”  BERNARD GERNIGON ET AL., FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AT WORK AND 
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS, 20 n.4 (2003).  But see, the U.N.’s International Cove-
nant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, which proclaims “[t]he right to strike, provided 
that it is exercised in conformity with the laws of the particular country.”  ICESCR, Art. 8(d).  
Collective Bargaining Convention (No. 154, art. 2) defines “collective bargaining” as extending 
“to all negotiations which take place between an employer” and a workers’ organization for: 
“(a) determining working conditions and terms of employment; and/or (b) regulating relations 
between employers and workers; and/or (c) regulating relations between employers or their or-
ganizations and a workers’ organization or workers’ organizations.”  ILO, C154 Collective Bar-
gaining Convention (1981), http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C154, (last visited Mar. 
31, 2005). 
 160. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. MacKay Radio and Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938); 
Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 790 (1990). 
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because of their “essential” services.  In case of federal workers, it is a 
criminal felony to strike.161 
Strikes likewise occur in China but are not explicitly provided for 
in law; neither are they prohibited.  As mentioned before, the 
ACFTU, according to Article 27 of the Trade Union Law, is called 
upon to mediate and assist the enterprise and employees in making 
proper preparations for resuming work and restoring work order as 
soon as possible when there is a “work stoppage or a slow down.”162  
Also, Article 47 of the 2002 Work Safety Law authorizes workers to 
stop work and leave the workplace if their personal safety is directly 
endangered.163  One could argue that there seems to be an emerging 
legally implicit acceptance of the right to strike. At the same time, 
however, there appears to be clear government disfavor against some 
of the strike leaders for bringing socia l disorder or interfering with 
production.164 
China’s 2004 Provisions purportedly seek to implement the 1994 
Labor Law’s call for collective contracts.  Included is regulation of the 
process, content, government supervision, and a dispute resolution 
mechanism, discussed below.  Whether these Provisions and the prac-
tices under them can meet the standards of the ILO Convention on 
Collective Bargaining will bear examination in the years ahead.  
Some China observers have expressed skepticism and concluded from 
the similar practices that preceded the new Provisions that “it is pri-
marily the continued integration of the trade union into management 
at the workplace that prevents collective consultation from providing 
an adequate framework for the regulation of labour relations.”165  The 
ICFTU is likewise critical, saying that earlier experiments show the 
“contracts [were] or are drawn up by employers and simply reflect 
 
 161. 18 U.S.C. § 1918(3) (2000). 
 162. TRADE UNION LAW, Art. 27. 
 163. ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO ANQUAN SHENGCHAN FA [WORK SAFETY LAW] 
art. 47 (Jun. 29, 2002). 
 164. FENG CHEN, Subsistence Crises, Managerial Corruption and Labor Protests in China , 44 
CHINA JOURNAL 41 (2002).  See also THE INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE UNION RIGHTS, China: Spe-
cial Report, available at http://www.ictur.labournet.org/China.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2005). 
 165. Clarke, supra note 3, at 235.  The Committee of Experts, under the ILO, states: “To be 
effective, the exercise of the right to collective bargaining requires that workers’ organizations 
are independent and not under the control of employers or employers’ organizations, and that 
the process of collective bargaining can proceed without undue interference by the authorities.” 
BERNARD GERNIGON ET AL., supra note 160, at 29. 
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minimum legal requirements or the continuation of past practice 
[and] [t]here is very little actual bargaining.”166 
Whether the Chinese collective negotiations under the 2004 Pro-
visions will evolve into a process that harmonizes with international 
labor standards awaits future examination of (1) practices under these 
new Provisions, (2) the evolving role of the ACFTU, and (3) the sub-
stantive content of resulting contracts.  It is evident that economic 
transition has awakened wage consciousness, and labor disputes in 
China have been on the rise in recent times.  Such circumstances may 
provide a positive impetus for utilizing the 2004 Provisions in a way 
that could evolve collective negotiations into more meaningful bar-
gaining. 
As China and the United States continue with their labor laws 
relating to the two ILO core labor standards covering the right to 
freedom of association and collective bargaining, the ILO notes that 
in numerical terms, “half of the world’s workers remain unprotected 
by the conventions’ provisions.  Alarmingly, large countries as Brazil, 
China, India, Mexico, and the United States have still not ratified 
fundamental ILO Conventions on freedom of association.”167 
B. Comparative U.S.-China Approaches: Collective Bargaining vs. 
Collective Negotiations 
A brief comparison of U.S.-China collective bargaining versus 
collective negotiations points out at least five areas of differences in 
approaches.  First, the parties are quite different in interests and con-
stituencies.  In the United States, unions must maintain an “arm’s 
length” relationship with the employer to avoid being subverted from 
the union’s single purpose of employee advocacy.168  This is explained 
by the unions having come into prominence only after fighting em-
ployers for the right.  In 1935, the NLRA granted employees in the 
private sector the right to be represented by a union in its workplace 
interests and collectively bargain through that representative free 
 
 166. ICFTU, China People’s Republic of: Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union 
Rights, supra  note 157.  “[G]iven the non-democratic, Party-dominated nature of unions, colle c-
tive bargaining fell far short of international standards.”  BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN 
RIGHTS, AND LABOR, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—2003, available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27768.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2005). 
 167. ICFTU Online, New Report: Half the World’s Workers Denied Fundamental Workers’ 
Rights, available at http://www.icftu.org/displaydocument.asp?Index=991219292&Language=EN 
(last visited Mar. 19, 2005).  For a detailed list of ratification status, see ILO, ILOLEX Conven-
tions,  http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2005). 
 168. See National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a)(2) (2000). 
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from employer’s (and later free from union’s) interference.169  Source 
is silent as to whether the collective bargain will be free from union 
interference.  The union typically is a local union affiliated with a na-
tional union.  These national unions usually support the efforts of the 
local union in organizing, bargaining, and, when necessary, striking.  
The union’s single purpose of employee advocacy is made possible by 
the union’s firm and unequivocal duty of fair representation owed to 
the employees it represents.  The union must deal “fairly” (diligently 
and non-arbitrarily) with the employees, including in the bargaining, 
contract administration, and the labor arbitration stages.  Violation of 
this duty is an unfair labor practice and can also be taken to the courts 
for a remedy.170 
In contrast, the function of the Chinese trade unions in a socialist 
planned economy was sometimes referred to as a “transmission belt” 
of the CCP; and, under the present socialist market economy, it has 
become a multi-purposed institution to promote China’s economic 
development and social stability, as well as its other role of protecting 
the labor rights of employees.  This is in stark contrast to the single-
purpose role of the union in the United States. 
The dual or multi-purpose of the Chinese union has created suf-
ficient ambiguity to raise issues whether collective negotiations is a 
conversation between two parties or a multi-headed monologue 
among parties with “harmonious” interests, which may or may not 
also capture the real interests of the Chinese employees.  This multi-
purpose approach might be usefully compared with Japan’s industrial 
relations approach where its unions have a dual purpose, advocating 
for employees and the employer’s economic well-being.  And, of 
course, the Chinese employees cannot choose an alternative union 
from the market place.  However, unlike in the United States, under 
Chinese law, employees may more easily “select” a union without an 
election process and without an employer campaign trying to per-
suade employees to vote for no union.  Even without the presence of 
an official union, the Chinese workers have the benefit of bargaining 
collectively as if they were unionized by passing the threshold of a 
 
 169. National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. §157 (2001) (granted employee’s right to 
organize).  However, the definition of employee excludes workers hired either by federal or 
state governments, see id. § 2(3)-(4). 
 170. See ROBERT A. GORMAN AND MATTHEW W. FINKIN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: 
UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 981-1018 (2d ed. 2004).  See also LABOR 
UNION LAW AND REGULATION 1-10 (William W. Osborne, Jr. et al. eds., 2003). 
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simply majority vote, to which an employer cannot object.171  Wal-
Mart has claimed no groups of employees in any of its many stores in 
China have ever asked for a union, which—if the union has decided 
it’s bad for business—could be true.172 
A second area of comparison is the type of employee groups rep-
resented by the union.  The unions in the United States use exclusive 
representation of a group of employees within the enterprises or an 
industry, whereas the Chinese unions generally utilize “enterprise un-
ionism” to negotiate for most employees within a particular enter-
prise.  Again, the Chinese approach is similar to the traditional bar-
gaining approach used by Japanese labor unions, though in recent 
years the latter also has begun to link with vertical union structures in 
more meaningful ways during negotiations.  The use of enterprise un-
ionism diminishes the power of the unions compared with an Ameri-
can-style union relationship, where unions can cross employer 
boundaries involving multi-employers and within entire industries 
with the ability to bring economic pressures on the larger employer 
group.  On the other hand, the ACFTU is expressly authorized to set 
up national or regional industrial trade unions as circumstances re-
quire for enterprises of some industries or industries of similar na-
ture.173 
A third difference is in the statutory definition of the scope of 
bargaining/negotiation.  In the United States, the NLRA uses a single 
phrase “wage, hours, and other terms and conditions”174 and lets the 
administrative agency and the courts subsequently broaden the cov-
erage by providing more detailed interpretations.175  The Chinese 
1994 Labor Law and the 2004 Provisions themselves supply great 
numbers of categories and illustrations of the types of items that are 
deemed proper subjects for negotiations.  Further clarifications of re-
lated labor laws can come through various legal interpretations from 
a variety of government branches and agencies, including the Su-
preme People’s Court, the State Council, and the MOLSS.  Perhaps 
the different approaches reflect a civil law system versus a common 
law system.  However, in reality, the small number of contract terms 
in the actual Chinese collective contract pales in comparison to the 
 
 171. PROVISIONS art. 20. 
 172. Wal-Mart Concedes China Can Make Unions, CHINA DAILY, (Nov. 23, 2004), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-11/23/content_394129.htm. 
 173. TRADE UNION LAW art. 12. 
 174. National Labor Relations Act § 8(d).  
 175. 48A Am. Jur. 2d Labor and Labor Relations §§ 3018-19 (2004). 
02_BROWN.DOC  3/1/2006   12:51 PM 
2006] CHINA’S COLLECTIVE CONTRACT PROVISIONS  67 
substantially thicker multi-terms of a typical U.S. collective bargain-
ing contract. 
Fourthly, bargaining duties in the United States and China are 
arguably similar.  Both U.S. and Chinese law say that the parties can-
not refuse to negotiate, must negotiate honestly and in “good faith,” 
must provide information upon request to the other party, and gener-
ally must engage in a process of proposing and counter-proposing.  In 
the United States, the law requires “good faith” bargaining by both 
sides over “mandatory subjects” (wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions) until agreement or impasse is reached.176  This means hav-
ing representatives independent from the other party’s representa-
tives, having authority to reach agreement, meeting at reasonable 
times and places, and generally offering and discussing proposals and 
counter-proposals in an attempt to reach an agreement.  If genuine 
“impasse” is reached in negotiations, in most cases after a first con-
tract, the parties must notify the government’s Federal Mediation and 
Conciliation Services (FMCS), which can assist the parties in trying to 
reach a mediated agreement.177  Upon impasse, the employer can uni-
laterally implement its last offers made to the union.  The union can 
picket and strike (as they also could before the impasse), and the em-
ployer may legally, temporarily or permanently , replace the striking 
employees.178 
Some conduct permissible in the United States, such as picketing, 
striking, and other economic pressures, is not a realistic and practical 
option in China.  As discussed, strikes in China do occur and are not 
legislatively banned, and the trade union has the responsibility to as-
sist in ending strikes, and, in some work safety situations, work stop-
pages may be acceptable.  Yet, under clearly established practices 
where there may well be government penalties associated with strike 
activ ities. 
Fifthly, there are clear differences in the U.S. and China ap-
proaches to enforcement and remedies against improper conduct.  The 
Chinese Labor Bureau has the responsibility to supervise the negotia-
tion process179 and to coordinate the parties in resolving issues180 by 
 
 176. See id. 
 177. Id. § 8(d)(3). 
 178. GORMAN ET AL., supra  note 160, at 600-15.  See Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. at 
345 (noting that employers may replace striking employees). 
 179. PROVISIONS art. 49. 
 180. TRADE UNION LAW art. 50. 
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conducting a “dispute resolution process.”181  Thus, it is at least argu-
able, in theory, that the Labor Bureau could mediate/negotiate a set-
tlement of certain improper conduct, as well as substantive contract 
issues, both presumably in accordance with legal requirements.  
However, very significantly, Article 54 of the 2004 Provisions stipu-
lates the mediated settlement is not effective until signed by the chief 
representatives of each side, thus apparently negating a unilateral de-
cision by the Labor Bureau.182 
Remedies may also be available under the Trade Union Law if 
the employer refuses collective negotiations requirements put for-
ward by the trade union without any proper reason.183  For improper 
conduct occurring during negotiation or arising later from the per-
formance of the collective contract that violates the labor rights (con-
tract or statutory) of employees, the disputes are to be resolved by 
Labor Arbitration Commission, with appeal to the courts for de novo 
review.  The Trade Union Law also provides a range of remedies for 
violation of employee and union member’s labor rights; as such the 
prevention of an individual’s joining a trade union,184 insulting a trade 
union member,185 hindering trade union investigation of labor right 
infringements,186 or refusing to hold equal negotiation without any 
tenable reasons.187  Remedies range from the trade union requesting 
government prosecution,188 to compensation (reinstatement with 
backpay or double the annual income of the wronged employee).189 
Comparison also reveals a significant difference in terms of the 
location of statutory remedies for violations of employees’ statutory 
labor rights related to collective negotiations.  In China, the statutory 
remedies are found in many locations involving numbers of labor 
laws.  One illustration of possible remedies for proscribed negotiation 
conduct can be found, as just discussed above, in the Trade Union 
Law.  Another example is seen in the case of the Labor Law, which 
provides that violations are to be rectified and appropriate compensa-
 
 181. Id. art. 53(4). 
 182. Id. art. 54. 
 183. Id. art. 56. 
 184. Id. art. 53. 
 185. Id. art. 51. 
 186. TRADE UNION LAW art. 53(3). 
 187. Id. art. 53(4). 
 188. Id. art. 54. 
 189. Id. art. 52. 
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tion owed should be paid.190  The 2004 Provisions, likewise, “house” 
another location for remedies.  Presumably, the Labor Arbitration 
Commissions through their labor arbitration tribunals will make ap-
propriate reference to and use of these legal rights and remedies. 
The U.S. approach of enforcement of statutory labor rights viola-
tions differs from that of the Chinese in that the United States has a 
single bureaucratic administration, the NLRB, and one single govern-
ing law, the NLRA that supervises the process.  The NLRB handles 
the adjudication of unfair labor practice cases, and its General Coun-
sel’s Office does the investigation and prosecution of law violators.191  
The NLRB is authorized to provide a range of remedies to “effectu-
ate the purposes of the Act.”192  These include “cease and desist” or-
ders, notice posting regarding violations, reinstatement, back pay, and 
a variety of other affirmative remedies.193  The law requires these 
remedies to be enforced through the courts.194  As to the enforcement 
of collective bargaining agreements, the contract rights are enforced 
by the parties through private (non-governmental) labor arbitra-
tion.195  This is authorized under the law and precludes going directly 
to court to enforce the collective bargaining agreement without first 
exhausting the arbitration process.196  Judicial review of the arbitra-
tion decision is limited to a review that usually defers to the arbitra-
tion decision, as long as the process was fair and regular. 
IV.  “IMAGINING” CHANGE: POSSIBILITIES FOR LABOR 
REFORM 
An objective examination of the 2004 Provisions may reveal to 
some the possibility that China’s collective negotiations could, with 
additional labor reforms, take on essential characteristics of collective 
bargaining, as reflected in ILO standards and U.S. experience.  While 
actual implementation is yet to be seen, one can be hopeful, within 
reason, that the steady evolvement in recent years’ labor legislation 
can be matched by labor reforms in practice.  Imagining what is pos-
sible, tempered by what is likely within “Chinese conditions,” can 
move forward the possibilities of real labor reform.  It is within that 
 
 190. LABOR LAW art. 91. 
 191. National Labor Relations Act, § 3. 
 192. Id. § 3(c).  
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. § 10(e).  
 195. Id. § 8(d). 
 196. Id. § 8(d)(4)(C); see also National Labor Relations Act, § 203(d). 
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spirit that the following possibilities for labor reform in China are 
suggested. 
A. Defining the Parties and Adjusting the Role of the Union 
Insisting on an “arm’s length” relationship between the employer 
and the union in representing entrepreneurial and employee welfare 
interests is a beginning and adheres more closely to the ILO labor 
standards.  Presently, the ACFTU is set up in labor relations to be all 
things to all people.  It is possible, without systemic changes in 
China’s political-legal system, to “de-integrate” the employer and un-
ion in their “symbiotic” relationship and still allow the union to have 
a dual purpose, similar perhaps to a Japanese-style, functioning to 
represent the employees while at the same time protecting the eco-
nomic best interests of the enterprise.  Arguably, it can even indi-
rectly serve a third purpose, the economic development of the country 
and its social stability.  Some years ago, the CCP pulled back from its 
direct intervention in enterprise management activities and perhaps 
that policy change could be a model for labor reform in collective ne-
gotiations.  But clearly under international standards, it should be the 
business of the employer, not the union, to make the case for its own 
interests.  Details of separating trade union representatives and man-
agement could be worked out and consideration might be given to the 
NLRA’s 8(a)(2) unfair labor practice limiting employer domination 
and interference with the labor union (or in China’s case, perhaps 
also visa-versa).197 
The role of the Chinese union can be slightly adjusted under ex-
isting policies.  Because China primarily uses “enterprise unionism” 
(bargaining at the employer level), as has been mentioned, it has be-
come enmeshed with the employer and management interests.  One 
way to intervene in this “sweetheart” relationship is to require a re-
gional (or “outside”) union to participate or perhaps have a leading 
role in the local negotiations, as the “professional representative” as 
is provided for in the 2004 Provisions.  Current Chinese law now 
permits the ACFTU to have national or regional unions and to pro-
vide assistance to local unions.  This practice is commonplace in the 
United States, and it allows for more independence in the negotia-
tion.  Additionally, this “outside” union representative can bring into 
the negotiation examples of “real” model contracts that show numer-
ous negotiated contractual supplements to statutory labor rights.  Pro-
 
 197. Id. § 8(a)(2). 
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fessional representatives of the union may also more easily propose 
limitations on employer rules and regulations, which under the labor 
contract provisions can be the basis for employee discipline and dis-
charge.198  Finally, perhaps some creatively delegated responsibilities 
and adherence to established international standards could be devised 
to guard the respective interests of the parties, especially those of the 
employees, to provide against mixed loyalties and conflicts of inter-
ests by the negotiating parties. 
An additional method of achieving increased autonomy of the 
union during collective negotiations is to place and enforce a stronger 
“duty of fair representation” on the union, so that the union will have 
to be accountable to represent its own constituency.  Presently, a duty 
of fair representation by the union already exists to a limited degree, 
as the union bears the responsibilities to solicit input from employees’ 
proposals, to report on the progress of discussions, and then to seek 
ratification by the employees of the negotiated contract.  But there 
seems to be no effective consequence for the union’s refusing or arbi-
trarily disregarding employee input on contract provisions or of not 
fully or fairly representing the employees’ interests in labor rights 
disputes.  Moreover, at the present time, without a stronger duty of 
fair representation, there seems little adverse consequence to the un-
ion representatives for exchanging confidential negotiating positions 
with the employer, unless that will indicate “bad faith” negotiating.  
Placing an affirmative obligation on the union and creating a legal 
cause of action by which the union’s action or inaction could be chal-
lenged by employees (not just through internal union processes) 
would encourage union responsibility to keep employees’ rights and 
interests in mind.  Internal union review presently is a mechanism in 
Article 55 of the Trade Union Law, which states: “[S]taff members to 
trade unions who, in violation of this Law, damage employees’ or 
trade union interests, shall be ordered to make corrections or be im-
posed sanction by trade unions at the same levels or higher trade un-
ions.”199 
The weakness is the absence of a clear definition of what “dam-
ages” employees’ interests; nor is there a clear consequence for these 
types of violations.  As a reference, unions’ constitutions and internal 
processes in the United States were determined to be inadequate by 
themselves to address such employee concerns.  As a result, the 
 
 198. LABOR LAW art. 25(2).  
 199. TRADE UNION LAW art. 55. 
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NLRB and the courts were made guardians of the employees’ treat-
ment by the union in fair representation cases. 
Another adjustment that can be made from existing law and 
practice is for the union to expand its current use of industrial unions.  
This provides protection to untold numbers of heretofore unrepre-
sented employees in need of protection of their labor rights and the 
ACFTU has already had successes in its use.  And, even where the 
union is successful, employers can still benefit by avoiding competi-
tive disadvantages from non-covered employers, as all in the industry 
would be subject to the same labor provisions, though perhaps with 
some local market variances. 
B. Adjusting the Scope and Content of Negotiated Contracts 
First, because collective wage negotiations reportedly are often 
conducted independently from collective negotiations, a natural ad-
justment would be to combine the negotiations and put into the nego-
tiated agreement a “re-opener” clause on wages after one year, but to 
keep the remainder of the collective contract in full force for its entire 
duration.  Such a provision is common in the United States.  This 
comprehensive agreement brings economic issues back to the negoti-
ating table where there can be part of a larger discussion on payment 
of employee welfare and benefit provisions.  The past practice in 
China of artificially removing wages and related items undercuts the 
emphasis of the new Provisions, which have a very broad scope for 
economic and non-economic topics for negotiation.  But without the 
subject of wages, the negotiation on economic issues is diminished. 
Related to the negotiation process and the statutorily expanded 
number of negotiation topics, the union must aim to achieve contrac-
tual labor rights above and supplementary to statutory labor rights.  It 
would seem that is part of the CCP’s interest in having the ACFTU 
promoting social stability, especially among society’s potentially vola-
tile employee force.  By the same token, the ACFTU can better serve 
its role of improving employment rights and benefits and channeling 
the conflicts into dispute resolution processes as prescribed by the 
Provisions.  The union of course, in its “dual purpose” role, can rea-
sonably take into consideration the market condition of the employer 
in formulating realistic negotiating proposals. 
Lastly and as briefly mentioned earlier, there seems to be, under 
the labor contract provisions of the Labor Law, an unnoticed and 
largely unlimited ability for employers in the form of “employer 
rules” to write into labor contracts innumerable grounds for legal 
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termination.  Employer rules and regulations are authorized by Arti-
cles 4 and 19 of the 1994 Labor Law, and they are apparently limited 
only in that they not be unlawful.  Nevertheless, they are rules by 
which employees can be “lawfully” disciplined or terminated under 
their labor contracts.  Article 25(2) of the Labor Law states that, 
where employees seriously violate the employer’s labor discipline 
(rules and regulations), they may be terminated.200  There is a legal 
requirement that these rules be placed in a labor contract; 201 there-
fore, it is interesting that studies did not find contract clauses in the 
content of the collective contracts that would place contractual limita-
tions on such seemingly unlimited employer power. 
An example of a case involving employer rules was where an 
employee’s termination for quarreling with her supervisor was upheld 
in arbitration because it violated an employer rule that an employee 
should never “publicly contradict a supervisor.”202  In the United 
States, while employers may impose certain rules of conduct on em-
ployees, the unions always address their concerns over these rules 
through other provisions in the collective bargaining agreement, such 
as a “good cause” limitation or a requirement of “progressive disci-
pline.” 
C. Clarifying Authority and Remedies of Labor Bureau 
Of great aid to a meaningful and consistent collective negotia-
tions process in China is to consider clarifying and strengthening the 
administrative authority and remedies of Labor Bureaus to supervise 
the conduct of the collective negotiations.  In China, the legal en-
forcement mechanism of labor rights and interests lies with govern-
ment administrative agencies, viz., the Labor Bureaus.  The Labor 
Bureaus supervise the collective negotiation process, whereas the la-
bor arbitration commission and tribunals adjudicate the labor rights 
violations.  However, the Labor Bureau has only a vaguely defined 
mediation role in seeking to resolve negotiation disputes, and the la-
bor arbitration forum for labor rights is there for employees who use 
them.  The Chinese system must use the labor arbitration commission 
and its tribunal as a “quasi-labor court” handling labor rights disputes 
arising from all sources, statutory and contractual. 
 
 200. LABOR LAW art. 25(2). 
 201. Id. art. 19(5). 
 202. See Lu Shihua, Yuangong shouche tiaozhan laodong fa [Employee Handbook Cha l-
lenges Law], ZHONGGUO LAODONG BAOZHANG BAO [CHINA LABOR AND SOCIAL SECURITY 
NEWS], Apr. 24, 2004, http://www.clssn.com/bqty/2004pdf/042401.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2005). 
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In contrast, the United States uses only the NLRB for issues re-
lating to the statutory negotiation process and related unfair labor 
practices but leaves collective contract rights disputes to private arbi-
tration and the courts.  Other statutory rights in the United States are 
typically enforced through other government administrative agencies, 
which are usually “housed” under the governing statutes.  There are 
benefits to both approaches, single versus multiple forums, assuming 
each is equipped with meaningful and effective authority and reme-
dies to correct and stop the labor law violations.  However, in the ex-
ample of China’s collective negotiations provisions, an employee, and 
even the Labor Bureau itself, may need to search in many “houses” 
for sources of labor rights and interests that might be violated, and 
possible remedies, which may vary.  For example, in collective nego-
tiations, obligations can arise from the Labor Law, the Trade Union 
Law or the 2004 Provisions on collective negotiations, as well as from 
other miscellaneous legal directives.  However, such “diffused” au-
thority may ameliorate the efficacy of the laws, even as they now ex-
ist. 
For instance, what if the employer were to engage in negotiation 
misconduct, such as “bad faith” bargaining?  Is it a violation of a labor 
interest for the Labor Bureau to resolve, or a labor right for the Labor 
Arbitration Commission and a Labor Arbitration Tribunal to re-
solve?  And, what is the remedy?  Do any of these government labor 
agencies have the authority to issue a “go back to negotiation” order?  
And even if so, how will the agency by legal means enforce that order 
against a recalcitrant employer?  The court will enforce a labor arbi-
tration decision, but how will the Labor Bureau, in a timely fashion, 
obtain such an order and also supervise the negotiation conduct of 
the parties?  If the negotiation misconduct also violates labor rights, 
how will the Labor Bureau, if at all, coordinate its supervision with 
the potential remedies coming from the Labor Arbitration Tribunals? 
One reform that could strengthen the administrative authority of 
the Labor Bureau to supervise negotiation conduct is to “clarify” Ar-
ticle 54 of the Provisions to broadly interpret “any disputes” as in-
cluding disputes about negotiation conduct.  A second clarification 
would be to remove the requirement that the parties must consent to 
a “Dispute Settlement Agreement,” as to negotiation conduct viola-
tions (as opposed to substantive terms of a collective contract). 
An alternative to providing the Labor Bureau sufficient author-
ity to supervise the negotiation conduct is to provide the parties direct 
access to the courts.  This would allow the employer or the trade un-
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ion (and possibly employees) to directly file a lawsuit on the “group 
labor dispute” in the appropriate court to determine if there were any 
legal violations of the requirements of negotiation conduct.  Pre-
sumably, the court could fashion an appropriate remedy  if a violation 
were found. 
Appeals from the administrative organs in China again are bifur-
cated.  For disputes arising out of the negotiations, the Provisions 
provide no clear guidance for review beyond the Labor Bureau level.  
Therefore, it is assumed that there could be a request for an adminis-
trative appeal within the MOLSS, and possible a review by the court.  
By contrast, for labor rights, employees go to intra-enterprise media-
tion or directly to the Labor Arbitration Commission that will set up 
Labor Arbitration Tribunals.  An appeal from this decision can be 
made to the courts, but it will be a de novo review causing added de-
lay and expense for the worker.  Some workers also have shown in-
terest in class-action suits (e.g., on the case of mass non-payment of 
wages by an employer).203  In the United States, the courts generally 
defer to the administrative decisions of the NLRB over statutory la-
bor disputes and also to the decisions of the private arbitrator in con-
tract labor disputes, thus providing employees with a much quicker 
decision than would exist if the case were re-litigated in the courts in 
the normal course of appeals. 
Workers in China also have sought remedies through options 
other than using the Labor Bureaus.  Strikes and economic protests in 
China do occur, often when an employer has refused to pay wages or 
honor safety conditions, and the employees erupt in frustration.  
However, strikers, and particularly strike leaders, are not well pro-
tected under the law and risk legal consequences.  Of course, strikes 
in the United States are not entirely risk-free, as employers have the 
legal right to permanently replace private employee strikers in order 
to keep their business operating. 
There are other remedies that could be provided as an alterna-
tive to unregulated strikes and protests and could channel these vola-
tile labor disputes into a regulated forum.  For example, in the United 
States, some local government employees are provided “interest arbi-
 
 203. Xinhua News Agency reported that 71 workers prevailed in the mass non-payment suit 
and local People’s Court helped the workers collect the judgment just before the employer 
could liquidate his assets.  See Laoban er’yi tuoqian gongzi fayuan gongzheng zhifa weihu gon-
gren quanyi [The People’s Court Protect Workers’ Rights], XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Oct. 14, 
2004, http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2004-10/14/content_2089502.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 
2005). 
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tration” in lieu of a strike.204  Indeed, strikes in state and local gov-
ernment are usually outlawed, and proposals have been made for us-
ing interest arbitration, partial strikes, and other mechanisms as al-
ternatives to the strike.205 
Of course, national characteristics always dominate, as they 
should, in the formulation and implementation of legislation.  In the 
area of collective negotiations some of the “Chinese national charac-
teristics,” or “Chinese environment,” include non-confrontational ne-
gotiations, unions born as implementers of national policies (rather 
than as employee advocates), enterprise unionism, the legacies of a 
socialist planned economy (such as the role of the trade union), and 
law enforcement and rule of law concepts that still need further de-
velopment in the minds of everyday citizens.  Implementation of the 
above suggested “clarifications” could certainly bring the practice of 
collective negotiations closer to meaningful collective bargaining un-
der international standards; and, in the process can ultimately lead to 
a better safeguarding of Chinese workers’ labor rights. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, there are benefits to an analysis that examines all 
the pieces of a particular law and practice.  Each can be examined 
piece-meal and/or as a whole.  And, one can surely anticipate that ex-
planations and reasons will be forthcoming on each proposal, “why 
this won’t work,” “why this is misunderstood,” and “why this is im-
practicable.” 
 
 204. Arbitration emerged as an alternative to strikes in addressing public sector labor-
management interests.  For example, the Ohio Collective Bargaining Act, OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. 4117.01-23 (2002), provides mechanisms to resolve disputes before strikes occur, and in 
the case of police, fire, and safety forces, to resolve disputes so that strikes would not occur.  For 
a detailed discussion, see James T. O’Reilly, More Magic with Less Smoke: A Ten Year Retro-
spective on Ohio’s Collective Bargaining Law , 19 DAYTON L. REV. 1 (1993).  Similarly, the Ore-
gon Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act (OrPECBA), OR. REV. STAT.  §§ 243.650-782 
(2002), prohibits police officers, firefighters, prison and mental health institution guards, and 
911 operators from striking, but provides them with a right to petition for interest arbitration.  
Martin H. Malin, Public Employees’ Right to Strike: Law and Experience, 26 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 313, 348-49 (1993). 
 205. See Merton C. Bernstein, Alternatives to the Strike in Public Labor Relations, 85 HARV. 
L. REV. 459, 459 (1971) (arguing that an absolute ban on strikes by public employees is ineffec-
tive, but proposing other procedures for public labor relations dispute resolution).  See also 
Benjamin Aaron, Unfair Labor Practices and the Right to Strike in the Public Sector: Has the 
National Labor Relations Act Been a Good Model, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1097, 1118-19 (1986) (dis-
cussing legal alternatives to the strike, as developed by individual U.S. states). 
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But just imagine  if the labor reformers in China can look past 
“things as they are” and instead focus on “things that never were” 
and say, “why not?”  Perhaps the use of the collective negotiations 
under the 2004 Provisions can aid in that process and provide the fo-
rum that channels the growing collective demands of workers for im-
proved labor rights and benefits. 
